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Abstract 
This paper examines the nature of the assertive speech act of Irish. We examine the syntactical 
constructional form of the assertive to identify its constructional signature. We consider the 
speech act as a construction whose meaning as an utterance depends on the framing situation 
and context, along with the common ground of the interlocutors. We identify how the assertive 
speech act is formalised to make it computer tractable for a software agent to compute its 
meaning, taking into account the contribution of situation, context and a dynamic common 
ground. Belief, desire and intention play a role in what is meant as against what is said. The nature 
of knowledge, and how it informs common ground, is explored along with the relationship 
between knowledge and language. Computing the meaning of a speech act in the situation 
requires us to consider the level of the interaction of all these dimensions. We argue that the 
contribution of lexicon and grammar, with the recognition of belief, desire and intentions in the 
situation type and associated illocutionary force, sociocultural conventions of the interlocutors 
along with their respective general and cultural knowledge, their common ground and other 
sources of contextual information are all important for representing meaning in communication. 
We show that the influence of the situation, context and common ground feeds into the utterance 
meaning derivation. The ‘what is said’ is reflected in the event and its semantics, while the ‘what 
is meant’ is derived at a higher level of abstraction within a situation. 
Keywords: Assertive speech act, Irish, situation, knowledge, common ground, software agent  
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely known and accepted that what is said is not always what is meant. The nature of the 
communication is important for the determination of an actual utterance, the actual speech act, 
by a hearer in a dialogue situation. That is, to assist in the unpacking of meaning, an 
understanding of the nature and structure of the utterance is needed. Additionally, so too is the 
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speaker’s1 intention and the hearer’s recognition of it. What is interesting about this is that the 
fulfilment of a communicative intention resides in its recognition by the hearer. An utterance 
therefore has an expression encapsulating an event with a linguistic structure and the utterance 
type identifies a speech act with an illocutionary force, and these are both connected in a 
meaningful way. The meaning of a speech act involves its situational context, content, common 
ground and S’s communicative intention.  
In this research study, we provide a characterisation of the ASSERTIVE speech act of Irish and its 
function, along with the syntactic nature and structure of the linguistic constructions that carry 
this particular speech act. We examine the role of the situation of the utterance, context and 
common ground pertaining to the interlocutors of the speech act. We are guided by the quote 
from Stalnaker: 
Let me begin with some truisms about assertions. First, assertions have content; an act 
of assertion is, among other things, the expression of a proposition–something that 
represents the world as being a certain way. Second, assertions are made in a context–
a situation that includes a speaker with certain beliefs and intentions, and some people 
with their own beliefs and intentions to whom the assertion is addressed. Third, 
sometimes the content of the assertion is dependent on the context in which it is made, 
for example, on who is speaking or when the act of assertion takes place. Fourth, acts 
of assertion affect, and are intended to affect, the context, in particular the attitudes of 
the participants in the situation; how the assertion affects the context will depend on 
its content (Stalnaker 1978, 78–95). 
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In section §2 next, we examine the nature and content 
of utterances and issues to do with the extent of the interlocutors’ knowledge and the role of 
common ground in the situational environment in which dialogue typically unfolds. We then, in 
§3, explore issues relating to mediating knowledge and language within a conversational 
software agent (CSA). In §4 we discuss issues of knowledge representation and the role this 
plays within a CSA. Section §5 foreground the important of the situation and context of the 
speech and how information from these saturate underspecified important elements in the 
interpretation of the meaning of the speech act utterance. In §6, the syntactic expression of the 
assertive speech act construction of Irish is characterised and its constructional schema identified, 
while in §7, the expression and formalisation of the assertive speech act of Irish is motivated.  
We finish in §8 with a concluding discussion on the dynamics of the meaningful unpacking of 
the meaning of a speech act and how this depends on the situation in which the dialogue 
utterance occurs and the context of the situation. 
2. THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF UTTERANCES 
2.1 THE EXTENT OF THE INTERLOCUTOR’S KNOWLEDGE 
Exchanging words in a conversational dialogue is essentially a form of social that typically 
                                                 
1 We use S for speaker and H for hearer throughout the paper. 
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unfolds in the context of a clear, well-defined social environment and situation. In such situations 
and their associated contexts, we initially build common ground and determine its scope and 
parameters, and assess the extent of the interlocutor’s knowledge to inform and progress the 
conversation towards common understanding. With people we know, we can rely on our shared 
knowledge and common ground to facilitate our communication. Communication is successful 
when H determines and unpacks S’s intentions from the type of the utterance speech act 
delivered.  
Determining the nature and content of utterances can be quite tricky but, as people, we tend to 
be good at this, given a reasonable common ground. Utterances can be ambiguous, or a person 
may speak figuratively and somewhat indirectly. The role of constructing, maintaining and 
leveraging a functioning common ground in support of successful communication can be difficult 
depending on the closeness (or not) of the background of the conversational interlocutors. When 
one of the interlocutors is a conversational software agent (CSA) then formalisation and specification 
as to what is considered in deriving utterance meaning, such that it can be computed in the 
software, is significant. 
2.2 THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION 
The theory of speech acts was derived to deal with natural language utterances that are not easily 
classified as being true or false, but rather, in the situation embracing their actual utterance, are 
actions in themselves. Speech act theory was extended to deal with all utterances based on the 
key insight that all utterances are actions of some sort (Austin 1975; Bach & Harnish 1979; Searle 
1969). A speech act is usually identified with its associated illocution and this illocution is usually 
seen to have two parts: an illocutionary force and a proposition (Searle, 1969). The illocutionary 
force distinguishes, for example, an assertion from a declaration, or an order from a promise; the 
proposition of the illocution describes the state of the world that is, respectively, asserted, ordered 
or promised. The propositional part of an illocution specifies the state of the world that it is relates 
to. An assertive speech act asserts of that state that it holds currently (though the proposition 
could be temporal in nature).  
A speech act is associated with at least three distinct actions:  
 (1) 
a) A locution: The physical utterance. 
b) An illocution: The conveying of the speaker's intent to the hearer. That is, the 
pragmatic 'illocutionary force' of the utterance, thus its intended 
significance as a socially valid verbal action. 
c) A number of 
perlocutions: 
 
 
 
Actions that occur as a result of the illocution, including its actual 
effect, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, 
inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, 
whether intended or not (Austin 1975). 
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Within a speech act, an intention is intended to be recognised, and the fulfilment of that intention 
consists of its recognition by H. The sort of intention with this feature expresses a belief or desire. 
Then, the act of linguistic communication is successful if H identifies the belief, or desire that S 
expresses. That is, communication occurs in virtue of H recognising the intention of S.  
 
Then, the linguistic communication is identified on the basis of what is said, together with mutual 
contextual beliefs in a co-constructed common ground. What is meant by an utterance is carried 
in part by what is said, the type of speech act uttered, the utterance context and the contribution 
of common ground.  The hearer can proceed to the identification of the speaker's illocutionary 
act through determining the speech act via its constructional pattern – its constructional 
signature, and the belief or desire that the speaker is expressing as an intention. That act of 
communication is successfully achieved if the hearer identifies the belief or desire expressed, in 
the way that the speaker intends it to be identified. Therefore, to inform someone of something 
is not only to express a belief in it but also to express one's intention that the hearer believes it. 
Belief, desire and intention are interrelated in speech acts and communication. In a dialogue, of 
course, the role of S and H swap as conversational turn are taken. 
3. MEDIATING KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE IN A SOFTWARE AGENT  
Identifying the forms of expression of the ASSERTIVE speech act constructions of Irish, and 
formalising these speech acts, are challenges we address in this paper. We concentrate on 
characterising the syntactic expression of the assertive speech act based on its constructional 
signature and its formalisation within a situation such that its meaning as an utterance can be 
determined and computed. Additionally, formalising the semantics of communications has been 
an on-going challenge in computational linguistics and computer science (Traum 1999), as 
multiple views of what can be formalised are possible, including what constitutes an evolving 
dynamic common ground over a discourse.  
Speech acts are classified into types and each type has a different function in communication: 
ASSERTIVES (Conveys information to H and is true or false), DIRECTIVES (Querying: Elicits 
information from H; Ordering: Demands action from H and causes H to behave in certain ways; 
Requesting: Elicits action from H or information from H), COMMISSIVES (Promising: Commits S to 
an action; Threatening: Commits S to an action that H does not want), DECLARATIVES (Causing 
events in themselves). 
A model of conversational software agents in a computational framework was advanced in Nolan 
(2014a) (see Figure 1) and we refine this here with regard to the ASSERTIVE speech act (Stalnaker 
1978). The model builds on the notion of a speech act and assumes a functional model of 
grammar, such as Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) (Nolan 2012, Van Valin 2005). 
Additionally, this computational framework for conversational software agents provides for the 
construction and maintenance of a common ground (Stalnaker 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Clark 1996; 
Clark & Carlson 1982) in a discourse workspace to underpin the conversational interaction, where 
the thinking on the nature of what constitutes a common ground is based on Kecskes and Zhang 
(2009).  
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Kecskes and Zhang (2009) propose an integrated concept of common ground, in which both a 
core common ground of assumed shared (cultural and ontological) knowledge, suitably 
represented, and an emergent common ground, showing emergence through use, converge to 
construct a rich background for communication. As such, common ground is a dynamic construct 
of shared knowledge that is mutually constructed by interlocutors (CG.S and CG.H) throughout 
the communicative process as a dynamic part of the CONTEXT. Here, speech act theory, 
implemented in software (with speech act constructions), forms the basis for successful 
communications, based on the idea that with language you not only make statements, but also 
perform actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: FRAMEWORK FOR A LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING CONVERSATIONAL SOFTWARE AGENT SYSTEM WITH A 
DYNAMIC COMMON GROUND 
 
As a part of the formalisation of the speech act of Irish, we will present common ground, for both 
S and H, as specialised knowledge representations pertinent to the communication process and 
the construction of a dynamic common ground. Contributing to knowledge management in a 
conversational software agent system, it is necessary to represent several important aspects (2) 
pertinent to the characterisation of the speech act appropriately (Nolan 2014). For the ASSERTIVE 
speech act, points (2a–e) are of concern here. 
 
 (2) Important aspects of a conversational agent-based system 
a. The set of beliefs that the agent has at any given time; 
b. The goals that agent will try to achieve;  
c. The actions that agent performs and 
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d. The knowledge of the effects of these actions;  
e. The environmental information / knowledge the agent has (which may be incomplete or 
incorrect);  
f. The ongoing discourse interaction that agent has with other (human) agents and their 
environment over time;  
g. Human language understanding and conversation tracking over a discourse. 
 
In order to define the cognitive states for an agent and use them to describe the various key 
dimensions and factors, PRECONDITIONS, POST-CONDITIONS, we need to employ several predicates 
that have a reserved meaning (3). 
 
(3) Cognitive states for an agent (Nolan 2014). 
a. BELIEVE′ (Agent, P), has the meaning that the agent believes that P is true for the agent, 
where P is an expression in a human natural language. 
b. KNOW′ (Agent, P) expresses a state of knowledge of the agent with respect to P. 
c. WANT′ (Agent, P) means that agent desires the event or state coded by P to occur. 
d. INTEND′ (Agent, P) means that the agent intends to do P. 
 
To support this agent, and motivate the interface between knowledge and language mediated by 
the speech act through the dynamic common ground of the interlocutors (human and software 
agent), the representation of knowledge is an important dimension of the model. We need this, 
for example, when considering what is encoded as salient within a dynamic common ground, or 
what is a shared social and cultural knowledge.  
4. KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AND CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS  
Knowledge representation is typically represented within an ontology which functions as a 
representation of some part of the world. Being computationally tractable, ontologies are 
amenable to formal methods in the algorithms for processing ontologies and the various 
linguistic constructions in a discourse.  
Knowledge representation is important for a software agent to enable its functioning and to 
mediate the interface between knowledge and language. A conversational software agent, as 
envisioned here represents its knowledge across an internal state model, an external interaction 
model plus a model of language. The internal model of the agent is concerned with the internal 
state of the agent, based upon the intersection at any given time of the agent’s internal beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. The external model of the agent is composed of an interaction model with 
its world (human and ‘other’ agent). The intersection of the agent’s internal beliefs, desires, and 
intentions are key to determining the meaning of the speech act utterance, in this instance, the 
assertive.  
 
Knowledge representation is used to encode knowledge in an agent’s knowledge base in a 
machine-tractable form, such that it can be used by the conversational agent software system to 
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perform efficiently, optimally and effectively in working with knowledge in its interface with 
language. A knowledge base is a core part of any conversational agent software system to map 
objects and relationships of the real world to computational objects and relationships, such that 
these are available to the software agent as part of its management of its own and its users’ 
common ground (CG). What an agent knows, or believes they know, desire and want, and 
therefore intend to do informs the utterance speech act. At the interface between knowledge and 
language we touch upon elements of deontic and epistemic modality2, along with evidentiality 
as they support the illocutionary force of the speech act.  
 
Ontological knowledge attempts to capture our understanding of a given information domain 
and the entities in that domain (Periñán-Pascual & Arcas Túnez 2007, 2010) and in many instances 
this is modelled computationally (Periñán-Pascual and Mairal Usón 2009; Ruiz de Mendoza, & 
Mairal Uson 2011). In the world of conversational agent software systems, the domain-specific 
knowledge is captured and typically, there would be multiple knowledge domains. This 
knowledge is utilised in the formation and maintenance of the common ground of the speakers 
(CG.S) and the common ground of the hearer (CG.H).  
 
The types of knowledge characterised and which is found in common ground relates to 
declarative, procedural, heuristic, meta and structural knowledge. Declarative knowledge 
regarding concepts, facts and entities. This type of knowledge describes what is known and 
includes simple statements that are asserted to be either true or false. This also includes a matrix 
of attributes and their values so that an entity or concept may be fully described. Procedural 
knowledge is to do with processes, rules strategies agendas and procedures. This type of 
knowledge describes how something operates or how a problem is solved, and provides 
directions on how to do something. Heuristic knowledge describes our experiential knowledge 
that guides the reasoning process. It is empirical and represents the knowledge compiled through 
the experience of solving past problems. Meta-knowledge is high-level knowledge about the 
other types of knowledge and how to use them, and describes knowledge about knowledge. We 
use this type of knowledge to guide our selection of other types of knowledge for solving a 
particular issue. This type of knowledge is used to enhance the efficiency of our reasoning by 
directing the reasoning processes into the most promising area. Structural knowledge is to do 
with our sets of rules, concept relationships and concept to entities relationships. It describes 
actual knowledge structures within our overall mental models. Our mental model of concepts, 
sub-concepts, and entities with all their attributes, values, and relationships is typical of this type 
of knowledge. The function of any knowledge representation in an ontology is to capture 
essential features of a class of things in a domain area and make that information available as 
required to describe some particular thing.    
 
The strategies for successful knowledge representation include use of logical schemes of 
predicate or propositional calculus; networked schemes of conceptual graphs or semantics nets; 
                                                 
2 Modality in Irish has been characterised in Nolan (2008).  
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procedural schemes, for example, IF (CONDITION) THEN (DO_ACTION) RULES; structured schemes 
consisting of scripts and frames. Logical schemes represent knowledge symbolically, while 
inference rules are based on clearly defined syntax and semantics. In procedural schemes, 
knowledge is represented as a set of instructions for problem-solving that allows us to modify a 
knowledge base easily and to separate a knowledge base from an inference mechanism. 
Networked schemes use a graph to represent knowledge where the various graph nodes display 
concepts in a domain while the edges define relationships between the entities, their attributes 
and the values of the attributes. Structured schemes extend networked representations by 
displaying each node in a graph as a complex data structure.  
5. THE SITUATION AND CONTEXT OF THE SPEECH ACT 
In this research study, we posit that a speech act meaning must be interpreted in the local context 
of a given situation. A situation is considered to be a structured entity with certain attributes that 
serves as a unifying device to link semantics to events through to syntax, and onwards to 
utterance meaning. The idea of a situation as important for utterance meaning has a strong 
respectable history in the philosophy of language and can be found in, for example, Austin (1975) 
with regard to speech acts, Barwise (1981, 1988) and Barwise and Perry (1983) within situation 
theory, and Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003) for HPSG. In Nolan (2017), we argued for a certain 
structure of a situation (4) with specific components. In this account relating to the ASSERTIVE 
speech act we suggest that this now needs to be expanded in key areas (5) to include the 
constructional signature, illocutionary force, initial context at the time of the speech act utterance 
and containing the initial common ground of the speaker S and hearer H along with the 
preconditions that exist, the speech act proposition, the belief, desire and intention (BDI) 
cognitive states of the speaker, and the post-context ‘as it is’ after the utterance of the speech act.  
The events and arguments of the situation remain represented, of course, as befits the speech act. 
 
(4) Constructional schema3 of a situation  
Situation s 
Event(s) < v1 (… vn) ... > 
Arguments < ARG1, (ARG2, …, ARGn) … > 
Semantics Nexus-juncture relations 
Location.time (time) 
Location.space (place – may be unspecified) 
(5) Constructional schema to support speech act meaning resolution  
SITUATION 
                                                 
3 The linking of constructions, considered as grammatical objects, into functional models of grammar is 
discussed in detail in Nolan and Diedrichsen (2013). 
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Loc.time 
Loc.space 
SIGNATURE                         
Utterance syntactic pattern  
ILLOCFORCE                  IL 
INITIAL CONTEXT 
(CommonGround) 
InitialCG.S 
InitialCG.H 
Precondition(s) 
PROPOSITION                 Prop 
BELIEF                            B 
DESIRE                           D 
INTENTION                     I 
POST CONTEXT 
Postconditions 
PostCG.S 
PostCG.H 
 
The illocutionary force is a fundamental primitive. The illocutionary points are assertive, directive, 
commissive, declarative and expressive. The illocutionary point of the type of illocutionary act is 
achieved if the act is successful. The illocutionary force will have a (scalar) degree of strength 
associated with it. The achievement mode suggests the sets of preconditions under which the 
illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of the speech act, including the 
appropriate level of authority of the speaker. The situational preconditions constrain what can be 
in the preposition for a specific illocutionary force. This depends directly on the situation and 
context framing the utterance. As well, certain preconditions hold for the successful performance 
of an illocutionary act. We can view these preconditions as ranging over the cognitive state of the 
agent. The conditions relate to the cognitive state of the agent with respect to Belief, Desire and 
Intention. These conditions may additionally have a degree of strength. 
6. THE ASSERTIVE SPEECH ACT OF IRISH 
In this section, we examine the assertive speech act found in Irish. We explore the expression of 
the speech act and its intended meaning, over and above what is simply said. We appeal to belief, 
desire and intention as component parts of the speech act. In the determination of uttered 
meaning, we additionally appeal to a logical form based on the logical structures of RRG, along 
with a predicate calculus type notation to encode belief, desire, intention and obligation. This 
gives the formalisation of the situation, context, common ground, and the speech act, a logical 
form amenable to treatment in software. 
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The set of those speech acts that express the speaker's belief, with their desire and intention that 
the hearer forms (or continues to hold) a similar belief are, as a grouping, called Constatives. 
Included within the set of constatives is the ASSERTIVE speech act that we discuss here for Irish. 
Assertives commit S to a proposition being true such that, in uttering the assertive, S asserts that 
proposition if S expresses a) the belief that the proposition holds, and b) the intention that H 
believe that proposition. An assertive is satisfied simply if its proposition is true at the moment 
the utterance is made. Therefore, the assertion Tá an doras dúnta ‘The door is closed’ is satisfied in 
this context of the utterance where it is true that the door is, in fact, closed. Broadly, this can occur 
in two forms in Irish, given in (6) and (7). The first form (6) used a syntactic construction with an 
auxiliary form to state a fact within the context of some situation. The second form (7) uses a 
lexical verb and has an actor and undergoer. 
 
(6) Assertive – utterance form 1  
a. Tá            an   doras    dúnta 
AUX.PRS  DET door:N  closed:VA 
The door is closed. 
 [be’ [door, closed’] 
b.  Constructional signature: [AUX.TNS NP VA] 
 
(7) Assertive– utterance form 2   
a. Dhún            Lorcan an   doras  
Close:V.PST  Lorcan DET door:N   
Lorcan closed the door. 
 [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]] 
b.  Constructional signature: [V.TNS  NP NP]   
 
Assertives include affirmations, allegations, statements, claims, tellings, and so on, and examples 
typically include utterances formed with the following (and related) verbs (8–15): dearbhaigh 
‘affirm’, maígh ‘allege, assert, claim’, fógair ‘declare’, séan ‘deny’, léirigh ‘indicate’, caomhnaigh 
‘maintain’, abair ‘say’, áitigh ‘submit’. Of course, this list is not exhaustive, merely indicative. 
 
(8) Dearbhaigh ‘affirm’  
Dhearbhaigh   sí        go          raibh           sí       ag         tacú  
Affirm:V.PST  3SG.F to:PREP be:AUX.PST 3SG.F at:PREP supporting:VN  
leis             an   mbille  
with:PREP DET bill:N 
She affirmed she was supporting the bill/  
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(9) Maígh ‘allege, assert, claim’ 
Maítear                  gur          cheil          siad  eolas 
Allege:V.PST+3PL that:PREP lost:V.PST 3PL  information:N 
They are alleged to have withheld information.  
 
 (10) Fógair‘declare’ 
D'fhógair                siad          go         síneoidís             an   comhaontú 
PRT+declare:V.PST 3PL.NOM to:PREP sign:V.FUT+3PL DET agreement 
They declared that they will sign the agreement.  
 
(11) Séan ‘deny’ 
Shéan           sí       arís     agus    arís   eile      gur   mharaigh  sí      iad  
Deny:V.PST 3SG.F again CONJ   again other that  kill:V.PST  3SG.F 3PL.ACC 
She repeatedly denied killing them.  
 
(12) Léirigh ‘indicate’ 
Léirigh              an   tástáil  go          raibh      feoil       chapaill    ann 
Indicate:V.PST DET test:N  to:PREP AUX.PST meat:N horse:N  there:DEIC 
Lit: The test indicated that horsemeat was there. 
The test indicated the presence of horsemeat.  
 
(13) Caomhnaigh ‘maintain’ 
Chaomhnaíomar        ár                    sean-nósanna  
Maintain:V.PST+1PL our:ADJ.POSS old:ADJ+customs:N 
We maintained our traditional customs.  
 
(14) Abair ‘say’ 
Dúirt         sí       go          raibh      sé       an-deacair 
Say:V.PST  3SG.F to:PREP  AUX.PST 3SG.M very:INTENSIFIER+difficult:ADJ 
She said that it was very difficult. 
 
(15) Áitigh ‘submit’ 
D'áitigh           a                         dhlíodóir   gur           
Submit:V.PST 3SG.M.POSS.ADJ  solicitor   that:PREP  
      iomrall   aithne      a     bhí         ann 
mistake identify REL AUX:PST there:DEIC 
His solicitor submitted that it was a case of mistaken identity.  
 
We next discuss the formalisation of these assertive speech acts of Irish. 
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7. FORMALISATION OF THE ASSERTIVE SPEECH ACT 
In arriving at an understanding of the assertive utterance meaning, we will appeal to the idea of 
a context of some situation, specific to S and H, at the moment of utterance. We will also appeal 
to the idea that S is motivated by a set of beliefs, desires and intentions and that this influences 
his discourse behaviour towards H. S will additionally make an assessment of the extent of the 
shared common ground with H and accordingly, through the discourse, construct the common 
ground and maintain it appropriately.  Both S and H each have a common ground (which we 
label as CG.S and CH.H respectively) and we assume that some but not all of this overlaps with 
common knowledge of various kinds. 
 
A formalisation of the assertive speech act for form 1 (6) is given in (16) and the corresponding 
formalisation for (7) is given in (17). In this formalisation we define the speech act construction 
and identify the Sit(uation), Cont(ext), CG.S (CommonGround.S), CG.H (CommonGround.H), 
Precon(ditions), Prop(osition), B(elief), D(esire), I(ntention) states, and Postcon(ditions) resulting 
from the utterance of the assertive speech act. We can assume that the illocutionary force of a 
message transmitted is the one that is obvious from its syntactic form of the utterance 
construction. We call this syntactic form the utterance its CONSTRUCTIONAL SIGNATURE. This 
syntactic pattern, the speech act signature, assists the software agent in determining which speech 
act is active and, correspondingly, assists in determining the illocutionary force of the utterance. 
In (16), we identify the situation with a label S and the context as C, while common ground for the 
S and H is denoted as CG.S and CG.H respectively. The relevant contents of common ground for S 
and H are explicitly identified. While the CG.H does not indicate content at this point, for CG.S we 
show this as containing two logical structures (LS): 1) [exist’ (door)] and 2) [be’ [door, open’]. 
These act as the precondition for S in making the assertive utterance. We indicate in (17) a similar 
formalisation for assertive form 2 showing the actor and undergoer within the various logical 
structures and in the B, D, and I states. 
 
Correspondingly, the B, D and I for S is shown. For B, we use a predicate BEL’ (LS), for D, we use 
a predicate WANT’ (LS) and for I, we use a predicate INTEND’ (LS). Reading these, S BELieves the 
door is closed. S desires (= WANTs’) that H BELieve the door is closed. S therefore intends that H 
BELieve the door is closed as a consequence of the assertive speech act. The resulting 
postcondition is that H BELieves the door is closed. The proposition of the assertive is that the 
door is closed. 
 
The conditions of satisfaction of different speech acts in the same class are identical. Their 
differences reside in the resolution of a number of pragmatic factors, e.g. the compatibility of the 
common ground of the agents involved and various matters of cultural convention.  
(16) Assertive - Formalisation of utterance form 1  
SIT 
LOC.TIME 
LOC.SPACE 
S 
time 
location 
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SIGNATURE AUX.TNS NP VA 
IllocForce ASSERTIVE 
INITIAL 
CONTEXT 
C(ONTEXT) 
1. Ontology: DOOR IS_A thing 
2. Ontology CLOSE IS_A event process 
InitialCG.S CG.S 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, open’] 
InitialCG.H CG.H 
1. __ 
Precon 1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, open’] 
Prop [be’ [door, closed’] 
B BEL’(S, [be’ [door, closed’]) 
D WANT’(S, BEL’(H, [be’ [door, closed’])) 
I INTEND’(S, BEL’(H, [be’ [door, closed’])) 
POST 
CONTEXT 
BEL’(H, [be’ [door, closed’]) 
Postcon BEL’(H, [be’ [door, closed’]) 
PostCG.S CG.S 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, closed’] 
PostCG.H CG.H 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, closed’] 
 
 
(17) Assertive - Formalisation of utterance form 2  
 
SIT 
LOC.TIME 
LOC.SPACE 
this.SIT 
time 
location 
SIGNATURE V.TNS  NP NP   
ILLOCF ASSERTIVE 
INITIAL 
CONText 
C 
1. Ontology: DOOR IS_A thing: 
2. Ontology: LORCAN IS_A person 
3. Ontology CLOSE IS_A event process 
InitialCG.S CG.S 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, open’] 
InitialCG.H CG.H 
1. __ 
PRECON 1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, open’] 
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PROP [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]] 
B BEL’(S, [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]]) 
D WANT’(S, [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]]) 
I INTEND’(S, BEL’(H, [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]]) 
POST 
CONTEXT 
BEL’(H, [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]]) 
POSTCON BEL’(H, [do’ (Lorcan) close’(Lorcan, door) ∧ be’ [door, closed’]]) 
POSTCG.S CG.S 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, closed’] 
POSTCG.H CG.H 
1. [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, closed’] 
 
The meaning of a speech act utterance is the content of a message that is intended by the speaker 
and recovered by the addressee, under normal conditions where rules of rational principles of 
cooperative language, as used in the Gricean (Grice 1957, 1969, 1986) sense, apply in discourse. 
The work of Grice in pragmatics and speech acts is useful in that it enables us to understand how 
speaker meaning, what someone uses an utterance to mean (what is meant) arises from sentence 
meaning, the syntactic constructional form and meaning of an utterance (what is said). Grice 
essentially proposed that a speaker's meaning results from the assumption that the participants 
in a conversation are cooperating in an attempt to reach mutual goals and understanding in 
dialogue. Grice called this the Cooperative Principle and it has four maxims that cooperative 
conversationalists need to respect: 
 (18)  Gricean Cooperative Principle  
1) The maxim of quality Speakers' contributions should to be true. 
2) The maxim of quantity Speakers' contributions should be only as 
informative as the situation require and 
speakers should refrain saying either too 
little or too much. 
3) The maxim of relevance Contributions should relate to the 
purpose of the exchange.  
4) The maxim of manner Contributions should avoid obscurity and 
ambiguity and be clear, orderly and 
succinct. 
We assume that the Cooperative Principle and its associated maxims apply in the agent 
framework. The speech act formalisation concerns the objective conditions of satisfaction for the 
speech act and its utterance meaning. Assertives, being claims of fact, are true or false. Computing 
the meaning of speech acts broadly corresponds to the conditions under which we would affirm 
that the given speech act had been satisfied. In this regard, intentions are a matter of what an 
agent really wants to achieve and reflect the agent's preferences, based on its beliefs and desires. 
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The development of a formal model of how the discourse meaning of the assertive speech act is 
composed from linguistic and non-linguistic components requires a formalisation of the speech 
act in its situation of occurrence and context, common ground, the belief, desire and intention of 
S (and H) and their respective common grounds along with several other important factors as 
discussed above. Utterance meaning is therefore highly context sensitive and is computed 
following a summation of information that is arrived at through different routes. We have 
outlined what these might be in our speech act formalisation. 
In a discourse situation, utterance meaning, as understood by the conversational interlocutors, 
must be sensitive to information from many different sources (Figure 2) and the dimensions of 
the situation: it is determined partially from the syntactic structure of the expression used with 
the uttered sentence, but also from the situation and its actual environment, gestures, shared 
assumptions, cultural knowledge, shared general knowledge, and local context-specific 
knowledge. 
We propose a partial sketch of how the various dimensions needed to derive utterance meaning 
link together in (19), based on our formalization of the assertive speech act in (17). In this situation, 
we have an utterance UTT1 containing an expression with a constructional signature of [V.TNS NP 
NP], signalling an illocutionary force of assertive. We represent this utterance as UTT1: [do’ (S, say’ 
(S, EXPRESSION1)) & CAUSE (hear’ (H, SA))] to indicate that the expression is the carrier of the what 
is said and which feeds into the speech utterance in the what is meant meaning derivation. We 
identify the interlocutors as S and H. We code an initial context of the situation showing a basic 
ontology. As part of the context, we show the initial common ground of S and common ground 
for H. We represent the utterance UTT1 as a logical structure in the style of RRG. At the event level, 
a simple4 verbal predication is found in a sentence with a single clause containing a single verb 
and its arguments that denote a single event and the participants of that event (19). The clause 
will have a single core and a single nucleus and unfold within a particular time envelope. We 
schematically identify the semantics as a logical form where the influence of the situation, context 
and common ground feeds into the utterance meaning derivation. The ‘what is said’ is reflected in 
the event and its semantics, while the ‘what is meant’ is derived at a higher level of abstraction. 
  
                                                 
4 Complex predications and complex events within a situation are reported on in Nolan (2017). 
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Expression of speech act utterance 
        SITUATION of utterance 
                CONTEXT of situation 
                        COMMON GROUND (of S and H) 
                                 Precondition(s) 
                                          BDI (of S and H) 
 
∑ 
COMPUTING OF MEANING 
                                        
 
                                       Revised BDI (of S and H) 
                                Postcondition(s) 
                        Updated COMMON GROUND (of S and H) 
               Updated CONTEXT  
 
FIGURE 2. COMPUTING OF ASSERTION MEANING FROM MULTIPLE INFORMATION SOURCES 
 
(19) Linking from speech act to meaning in the situation  
 
Situation this.SITa 
SIGNATURE V.TNS  NP NP   
ILLOCF ASSERTIVE 
INITIAL 
CONText 
C 
1. Ontology: DOOR IS_A thing: < ARG1> 
2. Ontology: LORCAN IS_A person: < ARG2> 
3. Ontology CLOSE IS_A event process: <v1> 
Common ground CG.S 
1.  [exist’ (door)] ∧ 
2. [be’ [door, open’] 
CG.H 
1. __ 
Speaker S 
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Hearer H 
ILLOCFORCE ASSERTIVE 
Speech act UTT1: [do’(S, say’(S, EXPRESSION1)) & CAUSE (hear’ (H, SA))] 
Event(s) EXPRESSION1: [do’ (ARG1) close’(ARG1, ARG2) ∧ be’ [ARG2, pred’]] 
<v1>: dún ‘close’: [do’ (X1) close’(X1, Y2) ∧ be’ [Y2, closed’]] 
Arguments < ARG1, ARG2 > 
Semantics <this.SITa  
    < CG.S 
         < CG.H 
              <[do’(S, say’(S, UTT1)) & CAUSE (hear’ (H, SA))] >>>> 
Nuclear juncture:  
Single nucleus, with all ARGs within the single NUC 
Location.time time 
Location.space location 
 
The contribution of the lexicon and the language grammar, along with the recognition of belief, 
desire and intentions in the type of situation and the associated illocutionary force, cultural 
conventions, general, specialist and cultural knowledge, common ground and other sources of 
information are all important in communication and for representing meaning in 
communication.  
 
Computing the meaning of a speech act in the situation requires us to consider the level of the 
interaction of all these dimensions. In the semantics of linguistic interaction, compositionality is 
a property of structures that combine information conveyed through different linguistic as well 
as non-linguistic means of communication. The meaning of the sentence is the meaning of its 
utterance in its context. Computing meaning from a speech act is a dynamic process co-
constructed in discourse and arises from the agent’s intention to express and negotiate views and 
attitudes. 
8. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have characterised the assertive speech act of Irish. We argued that, in order to 
compute the utterance meaning, a consideration of the situation of the assertion, its context and 
common ground is necessary. While this occurs dynamically and naturally between two human 
interlocutors in a dialogue, but when one of the interlocutors is actually a conversational agent 
then the factors whereby the computation is achieved needs to be spelt out formally. The 
immediate requirement is to actually specify the formal information needs that feed info the 
information flows of the meaning summation of the utterance speech act within the software. We 
have proposed a model of a conversational agent framework and, in this paper, treated the 
ASSERTIVE speech act of Irish. 
We found that the meaningful unpacking of the meaning of a speech act, the ‘what is meant’, 
depends on the situation in which the dialogue utterance occurs and the context of the situation. 
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This is the situation of the discourse speech act. The context and the situational frame contribute 
to the meaning over and above the ‘what is said’.  
For an assertive speech act utterance that declares some fact that can resolve to some truth 
condition, this situational context informs common ground and interpretation of the speech act. 
This may include, for example, the contextual assignment of values to any indexical elements and 
variables in the logical structure of the utterance. The meaningful unpacking of the meaning of a 
speech act interaction involves consideration of S’s intentions, plus their beliefs and desires, and 
the requirements posed by the common ground. The beliefs and desires motivate the sets of 
intentions of S. 
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